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The purpose of this study is to analyze the comparative model of judicial review in 
Indonesia and other countries. This research uses normative legal research. The 
approaches used by researchers in compiling this research are, among others: the legal 
approach; historical approach; and comparative approach. The results of this study 
indicate that in principle the constitutional review system in several countries shows a 
variety of color gradations that are tailored to the needs of each country. In general, 
there are 3 (three) constitutionality testing mechanisms that have been developed to 
date, namely: First, the constitutionality testing of laws is carried out by existing 
judicial institutions or non-special adjudication, namely the Supreme Court. The 
country that adopts this system is the United States of America. Second, the 
constitutionality test of the law is carried out by a special judicial institution, namely 
the Constitutional Court. Countries that have adopted this system are Indonesia, 
Germany, South Korea, South Africa, Russia, Thailand and Turkey. The 
constitutionality of the law is examined by non-judicial institutions. The country that 
adopted this system is France. 










Previously the Judicial Review 
was often compared to the system 
that had lived in the Ancient Greek 
system, namely in the ancient 
Athens kingdom. Mauru 
Cappelletti1 for example, explaining 
that the ancient Greek legal system, 
in the Kingdom of Athens, 
distinguished in principle between 
the term nomoi (constitution) and 
the term psephisma (law), which 
was then explained further, that 
whatever the content and form of 
psephisma must not conflict with 
the nomoi which has implications 
for its implementation, because 
nomoi is the basis for the legitimacy 
of the birth of the psephism 
provisions, so that the two thoughts 
of the state must be in harmony with 
each other, this is to build cohesion 
and harmony aimed at bringing 
harmony from a state 
administration life arrangement in a 
country, as has been practiced In 
Athens, Greece, although later at 
that time, there was no institution 
or mechanism specifically for 
carrying out the guarding of nomoi 
values..2 Therefore, in the 
Indonesian context, one form of 
recognition regarding the existence 
 
1  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model 
Pengujian Konstitusional Di Berbagai 
Negara (Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, 
2005), hal.10 
2  Bahder Johan Nasution, Negara Hukum 
dan Hak Asasi Manusia, Cet. Ke-V. 
(Bandung: Mandar Maju, 2018), hal. 74 
of law is made as an aspect of the 
constitution.3  
Based on these arguments, it 
can be seen that from a 
constitutional point of view, it is no 
exaggeration to say that the rule of 
law can be said to be one of the goals 
of the Indonesian nation and state 
to establish this country. In this 
regard, the concept of the 
Indonesian state, among others, 
determines that the government is 
limited by the provisions outlined in 
the constitution, this is a form of an 
effort to adopt the principle of 
supremacy of the constitution by 
adopting a hierarchical system of 
laws and regulations proposed by 
Hans Kelsen through his theory that 
known as "stufenbau theory", in the 
principle of stufenbau theory, places 
the 1945 Constitution at the top of 
the Pyramid, while other provisions 
are under the constitution. (UUD 
1945). 
The logical consequence of 
this understanding is that all forms 
of state activity must have legal 
legitimacy roots so that the state 
system can grow properly and 
develop properly. One of the main 
issues that have also become a 
concern in the last few centuries, 
where the state needs a control 
mechanism for various legal 
3  Ahmad, Ahmad, and Novendri M. Nggilu. 
"Denyut Nadi Amandemen Kelima UUD 
1945 melalui Pelibatan Mahkamah 
Konstitusi sebagai Prinsip the Guardian 
of the Constitution." Jurnal 
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products issued by state 
institutions that make national 
legislation products in the form of 
laws, this institution carries out the 
function of power in the field of 
national legislation (in the 
Indonesian context is the DPR and 
DPD institutions together with the 
President). 
The affirmation of the 
importance of maintaining harmony 
and conformity between norms from 
the top of the pyramid (basic law) to 
the lowest level of the pyramid 
(implementing rules) made by the 
institution entrusted with the task 
of making legislative products, has 
been warned by Hans Kelsen, that 
the constitutional implementation of 
legislation can be legally 
enforceable. effective only if an 
organ other than the legislative body 
is given the task of examining 
whether a legal product is 
constitutional or not, and does not 
enforce it if according to this organ 
the legal product is 
unconstitutional. For this purpose, 
special organs can be established, 
such as a special court called the 
Constitutional Court, or control over 
the constitutionality of laws (judicial 
review) given to ordinary courts, 
especially the Supreme Court.4 
Because of the differences in 
the assessment institutions from 
the constitutional aspect to the 
products of legislation to carry out 
 
4  Fadhli Zulfahmi Nst dan Sufyan, Op.Cit, 
hal. 46-47 
the control mechanism in a country, 
such as the differences in 
institutions that run the judicial 
review mechanism between 
Indonesia and France, for example, 
it is very important to present 
material for comparison of the 
judicial review mechanism in 
several countries. in the world as an 
effort to find the ideal form of future 
law testing.  
B. Research Problem 
Based on the description of the 
background, the author makes a 
formulation of the problem that 
becomes the study material, as for 
the formulation of the problem, 
namely how is the comparison 
model for testing norms in Indonesia 
and other countries? 
C. Research Methods 
The type of research used is 
normative legal research, where the 
object of study includes basic norms 
or rules, legal principles, statutory 
regulations, comparative law, 
doctrine, and jurisprudence. The 
approaches used by researchers in 
compiling this research are, among 
others: the legal approach (statue 
approach); the historical approach 
(historical approach); and a 
comparative approach (comparative 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Comparative Model of Norm 
Testing in Indonesia and Other 
Countries 
1. Judicial Review in Indonesia	
Constitutional Court in the 
Indonesian state administration 
system provides fresh air that 
political processes such as the 
formation of laws, the dissolution of 
political parties, and the 
impeachment of the President 
and/or Vice President run in 
accordance with the law. without 
political content. Where the 
Constitutional Court acts as a 
neutralizer or neutralizer for 
political institutions.5 After being 
established based on Law Number 
24 of 2003 This assertion has been 
conveyed by Mahfud MD, that "Law 
is a political product so that the 
character of the contents of each 
legal product will be largely 
determined or colored by the 
balance of power or political 
configuration that gave birth to it.6 
That is why then, in the 
provisions regarding the 
 
5  Ali Marwan Hsb, “Mahkamah Konstitusi 
sebagai Neutralizer terhadap Lembaga 
Politik”, Jurnal Rechtsvinding, Volume 2 
(3), 2013, hal. 316 – 317. Lihat juga 
dalam Ali Marwan Hsb, Putusan Final 
Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Hal 
Pemakzulan Presiden dan/atau Wakil 
Presiden, Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia, 
Volume 14 (3), 2017, hal. 276 
Constitutional Court from the 
beginning it was designed as a state 
institution that balances the 
political power of national legislation 
which could dominate lawmaking by 
ignoring the constitutional aspects 
of the birth of a national legislation 
product made by the DPR RI. 
together with the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the DPD 
RI. It is stated that the decision of 
the Constitutional Court is final, 
first and last.7 
The examination of the law is 
divided into two, namely material 
and formal examinations. According 
to Jimly Asshiddiqie, the different 
types of testing are:,8 born from the 
difference in understanding between 
wet in material zin (Law in the 
material sense) and wet in formal zin 
(Law in the formal sense). The 
limitations of the proceedings can be 
seen in the regulations regarding the 
Procedural Law for Judicial Review, 
both those regulated in Law 
24/2003, Law 8/2011, and PMK 
6/2005, as well as the principles of 
judicial power in general. 
The test results in the 
cancellation of part of the content 
material or part of the law in 
6  Moh. Mahfud MD, Membangun Politik 
Hukum, Menegakkan Konstitusi, 
(Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2011), hal. 64 
7  Wicipto Setiadi, “Dukungan Politik 
dalam Implementasi Putusan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi”, Jurnal 
Rechtsvinding, Volume 2 (3), 2013, hal. 
300. 
8  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara 
Pengujian Undang-Undang, (Jakarta: 
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question. What is meant by the 
content of the law is the content of 
certain paragraphs, articles, and/or 
parts of the law, it can even be only 
one word, one point, one comma, or 
one letter which is considered 
contrary to the Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia of 
1945. On the other hand, what is 
meant by part of the law may also be 
the whole of a part of the whole of a 
chapter of the law concerned. 
These benchmarks make the 
concept of constitutionality not only 
limited to the 1945 Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia textually 
but in a broad sense where the 
Constitutional Court in examining 
various constitutionality cases of a 
law product must explore the 
abstract aspect, namely Pancasila. 
as a touchstone. 
Continuing on measuring 
instruments and evidence, the case 
decided is also influenced by the 
judge's conviction. This can be seen 
in Article 45 Paragraph (1) of Law 
24/2003, which reads "The 
Constitutional Court decides cases 
based on the 1945 Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia following 
the evidence and the judge's 
conviction". The pattern of the 
relationship between judges' beliefs 
in assessing evidence is divided into 
several theories, but the most 
relevant to Article 45 of Law 
24/2003 is the negative pattern of 
 
9  Riawan Tjandra, Teori dan Praktek 
Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara, 
proving the law (negative wettelijk). 
According to Riawan Tjandra, this 
pattern is a combination of the 
theory of proof according to the law 
with a system of proof according to 
the judge's belief.9  
The scope of the Judicial 
Review is inseparable from the 
discussion of the Decision and its 
legal consequences. There are 3 
(three) types of decisions in the case 
of judicial review, namely: 
a) Application not accepted;  
b) Application is granted; dan  
c) Application rejected. 
In the case of a decision that 
reads “the application cannot be 
accepted”, restrictions on the 
content or content of the decision 
are regulated in Article 57 
paragraph (2A) of Law 8/2011 
regarding matters that are not 
included in the decision, namely:	
(1) Amar other than those 
referred to in paragraph (1) 
and paragraph (2);  
(2) Orders to legislators; and  
(3) The formulation of norms 
as a substitute for norms 
from laws that are declared 
contrary to the 1945 
Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
Limiting the content or content 
of the decision, is a limitation on the 
authority of judges, preventing 
judges from playing the role of 
legislators in the presence of 
(Yogyakarta: Universitas Atma Jaya, 
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substitute norms. Another form of 
restriction is contained in Article 
45A of Law 8/2011 which reads: 
“The decision of the 
Constitutional Court may not 
contain a decision that is not 
requested by the applicant or 
exceeds the applicant's 
application, except for certain 
matters relating to the subject 
matter of the application.” 
The limitation is a precaution 
against potential Ultra Petita 
Decisions. As a result, in practice, 
there are always deliberate 
deviations to close the gap between 
written rules and regulatory 
requirements. The same thing also 
happened in the case of Judicial 
Review, whose decision was aimed 
at providing constitutional justice. 
To date, the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court has recorded 
some progressive progress in terms 
of judicial review of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, but it is not uncommon 
for the Constitutional Court as the 
bodyguarding the soul of the 
Indonesian Constitution to fall short 
of the expectations and high 
expectations of the public towards 
this constitutional court. 
 
10  Albert P. Melon dan George Mace, 
Judicial review and American 
Democracy, (United States:  Iowa State 
University Press), hal. 21. 
2. Judicial review in the United 
States 
In the United States, the 
Judicial Review is carried out on 
three key areas of constitutional 
interaction, namely, interactions 
between Federal and State 
governments, interactions between 
state organs at the national and 
state levels interactions between 
State governments and 
individuals.10 
Functionally, judicial review 
authority in the United States is also 
exercised by ordinary courts 
through a decentralized or diffuse or 
dispersed review that is incidental, 
meaning that the examination is not 
institutional as a stand-alone case 
but is included in the ordinary case 
being examined. by judges at all 
levels of the court. In various 
judicial review cases that are 
examined in ordinary courts, the 
decisions are only binding on the 
parties to the dispute in the case 
(inter partes). Other things can be 
universally applicable if the decision 
contains the principle of stare 
decisis, then this requires the court 
in the future to be bound to follow 
similar decisions that have been 
taken previously by other judges or 
in other cases. (jurisprudence).11  
The implementation of judicial 
review in the Supreme Court 
institution applies hierarchically in 
11  Ahmadi, Konstitusional Review: Suatu 
Perbandingan Praktek Ketatanegaraan, 
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the sense that the judicial review 
authority also applies to lower 
judicial institutions scattered in 
various areas of the federation. In 
principle, the judicial review 
authority in the United States 
constitutional practice is not special 
treatment in the judiciary. This 
becomes relevant when viewed from 
a material perspective as well as the 
legal culture that lives and develops 
in the country.12 
The practice of constitutional 
review with this approach to the 
expansion of authority is reasonable 
and is the right choice for countries 
that adhere to the Anglo-Saxon 
system. In a stretch of law in a 
country like this, the invention, 
creation, and even the formation 
and application of law are indeed 
very much dominated by judges. In 
the sense of the word that judges in 
the state become 'indirect law'13 In 
the context of law formation, in an 
Anglo-Saxon-leaning country, the 
parliament does not prioritize the 
production of laws at all. The reverse 
fact that has become a tradition in 
countries that are based on the 
tradition of "civil law" or the 
European continental legal system, 
including Indonesia, the thing that 
becomes the focus of parliament's 
tasks is to continue to review and 
produce written laws. The 
 
12  Ibid, hal 54-55 
13  In the history of justice in America, the 
role of judges is really manifested in the 
principle of separation of branches of 
state power. In the tradition of law 
experience of the Anglo Saxon 
tradition and these substantial 
principles have then dominantly 
formed a judicial style regarding 
judicial review where this authority 
is sufficient to be exercised by an 
existing court and therefore there is 
no need to form a new institution to 
specifically handle judicial review 
cases. The Supreme Court has a full 
role as The Guardian or the 
Protector of the Constitution 
(guarding, protecting, and purifying 
the Constitution).14 
Between the mechanism for 
reviewing Indonesian laws and the 
United States, in practice, there are 
differences, where Indonesia from 
the institutional side has formed its 
own institution so that the 
mechanism is through the concept 
of Judicial Review through the 
constitutional court institution, 
namely the Constitutional Court. 
Meanwhile, in the United States, in 
the practice of testing the law, there 
is no special judicial institution like 
Indonesia, but this mechanism is 
attached to the judicial institution of 
the Supreme Court, whose function, 
apart from testing the law against 
the United States constitution (court 
of law), also has the authority to 
matters of justice. 
In addition to institutional 
differences, what is also a difference 
formation, the common law tradition is 
adopted where this tradition is also 
known as "judge-made law". 
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between the mechanism for 
reviewing Indonesian and the 
United States laws is related to the 
decision-making mechanism by the 
judges of the United States Supreme 
Court, wherein the mechanism, the 
Supreme Court Judge does not only 
base decision-making on the judge's 
opinion, he neglects to ask for an 
opinion. from the constitution-
making body related to the 
interpretation of a constitutional 
provision of an article, paragraph, or 
other provision contained in the US 
constitution, so that this 
mechanism will make it easier for 
US Supreme Court Judges in giving 
a Decision.	
3. Judicial review in the South 
Afrika 
Three specific paths were taken 
by the framers of the South African 
Constitution when drafting the 
constitution, First, the drafters 
through the Constitution created 
the Constitutional Court institution 
at the top of the judicial system. 
Second, the formulator through the 
Constitution creates a large number 
of rights that are rooted in the 
highest and can be justified through 
the protection of human rights. 
Third, the formulator through the 
Constitution grants the right of 
review to the court.15 
 
15  Stacia L. Haynie, Structure and Context 
of Judicial Institutions in Democratizing 
Countries: The Philippines and South 
Africa, Arellano Law and Policy Review 
Journal, Volume 5 (2), hal. 41 
Departing from the importance 
of the people's self-believing in its 
constitution, South Africa 
disseminated its draft constitution 
through radio, television, bulletins 
as well as seminars. As a result, it is 
estimated that 82 percent of the 
population over the age of 18 listens 
to constitutional radio broadcasts; 
Thirty-seven programs on the 
constitution on television received 
rave reviews by 34 percent of 
viewers; Every two weeks 160,000 
Constitutional Assembly bulletins 
are distributed to the general public. 
Finally, in April 1996 before the 
draft constitution was completed, an 
independent survey concluded that 
the constitutional reform campaign 
had captured 73 percent of South 
African adults.16 Last but not least 
South Africa has benefited from the 
leadership of statesmen like 
President Nelson Mandela. 
The establishment of the 
Constitutional Court is intended to 
increase the legitimacy of the legal 
system in various ways. The 
Constitutional Court was 
established to ensure legislative and 
executive compliance with 
entrenched principles and to resolve 
all constitutional challenges as the 
final arbiter of legal disputes. The 
Constitution stipulates that the 
Constitutional Court "makes the 
16  Christina Murray. A Constitutional 
Beginning: Making South Africa's Final 
Constitution, Journal University of 
Arkansas At Little Rock Law Review, 
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final decision" on matters relating to 
the "interpretation, protection and 
enforcement of the Constitution."17 
As is well known, the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa has decisions 
binding on all legislative, executive, 
and judicial bodies of the country.18 
In addition, the salaries of all judges 
are protected from deduction, and 
judges can only be removed by the 
"President on the basis of 
misconduct, incompetence, or lack 
of adequate competence" 
determined by an agency or agency 
of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court 
provides the basis for the 
supremacy of the constitution itself. 
Various "fundamental rights"19 
embedded in the new South African 
Constitution. These rights represent 
the first time in South African 
history that individual rights and 
freedoms are defined and protected 
by constitutional law.20 In addition, 
 
17  Chapter 8, Section 167, 1996 
Constitution Constitution Republic of 
South Africa 
18  Chapter 8, Section 165 & 167, 1996 
Constitution Constitution Republic of 
South Africa	
19  Among them are equality, human 
dignity, life, freedom from slavery and 
forced labor, religion, beliefs and 
opinions, privacy, expression, assembly, 
demonstrations and petitions, 
associations, political rights, freedom of 
movement and residence, protection of 
labor, economic activities, protection of 
property, right to housing, health care, 
food, water, and social security rights, 
protection of language and culture, 
protection of culture, religion and 
language, rights of the accused, 
environmental rights, protection of child 
welfare, and education. 
the constitution gives the judiciary 
the power to review legislative acts 
for constitutional compliance, 
increasing the capacity of an 
independent judiciary to emerge. 
The constitution explicitly addresses 
the independence of the courts. 
Courts are considered "independent 
and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, 
endorsement or prejudice.".21 In 
addition, "No person and no state 
organ can interfere with the 
functioning of the courts ...," and 
"state organs" are needed to "assist 
and protect the courts to ensure the 
independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility, and effectiveness of 
the judiciary. The concept of judicial 
review was also important in 
increasing the legitimacy of the 
courts in the eyes of the white 
minority population who favored 
20 Several individual rights and liberties are 
retained under the common law of the 
apartheid-era legal system, but these 
rights can be revoked by simple 
parliamentary legislation. Only two 
rights are considered "rooted". One is 
related to the similarities between 
English and Afrikaans as official 
languages. The second is the protection 
of mixed-race voters in the Cape. 
Changing the two requires two-thirds of 
the Parliamentary vote. However, in the 
1950s, through various political 
intrigues, Parliament eliminated voters 
of color by multiplying members of 
Parliament so that technically they could 
get the required two-thirds of the vote. 
21  Chapter 8, Section 165, 1996 
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special protection of individual 
rights. 
The existence of a review 
mechanism greatly enhances the 
independence of the judiciary, but 
such guarantees mean little if court 
decisions are repeatedly ignored or 
undermined by the regime. The 
Constitutional Court, with judges 
essentially ideologically sympathetic 
to the regime, in general, has ruled 
consistently with the preferences of 
the ANC. However, as noted above, 
in some judgments, the new 
government has lost; However, so 
far the government has supported 
the capacity of the courts to take 
decisions against it. This increases 
the position and independence of 
the Constitutional Court.22 
What is interesting in the 
constitutional justice system in 
South Africa is the authority granted 
by the state through its 
Constitution, namely the authority 
to assess the constitutionality 
aspects of changes to the 
constitution or the constitution of 
this country, where the South 
African Constitutional Court has the 
authority to provide 
constitutionalism certification of 
constitutional amendments. Before 
giving the certification as intended, 
a barometer or measure of 
constitutional changes is first set, 
from there then the indicators of 
constitutionalism as a barometer of 
 
22  Stacia L. Haynie, Structure. Op. cit,  hal. 
46 
change that will be used by the 
Constitutional Court to assess and 
certify the products of constitutional 
amendments carried out by the 
South African Constitutional 
Commission, in which there are 
members of representative 
institutions who are also the 
formulators of the new constitution 
that will be produced. 
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the 
mechanism for changing the 
constitution by granting 
certification is completely unknown 
in constitutional changes in 
Indonesia, so that all material 
changes are fully submitted to the 
state institution in the legislative 
sphere, namely the People's 
Consultative Assembly of the 
Republic of Indonesia to amend and 
stipulate the results of the 
amendment as a new constitution. 
The new constitution that was made 
did not involve other state 
institutions, especially the judicial 
power institution, namely the 
Constitutional Court to be involved 
in assessing aspects of the 
fulfillment of constitutionalism for 
new constitutional products as 
practiced in South Africa to certify 
the constitution before it was 
stipulated as the country's 
constitution. . That is why then, the 
practice of changing the 
constitution in South Africa by 
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the Judiciary (MK South Africa) to 
provide constitutionalism 
legitimacy, is considered by 
constitutional or constitutional law 
experts as the best and most 
successful mechanism for 
constitutional change that has ever 
been carried out in Indonesia. world.	
4. Judicial Review in South 
Korea  
Interestingly, in South Korea 
before the establishment of the 
constitutional court, the judicial 
review mechanism was carried out 
by the South Korean Supreme 
Court, then in 1988 the South 
Korean Constitutional Court was 
officially formed with almost the 
same authority as the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court, the only 
difference being that it had a wrong 
function. owned by the South 
Korean Constitutional Court which 
until today in Indonesia has not 
used this mechanism, the 
mechanism is the constitutional 
complaint. According to the South 
Korean constitution which was later 
also regulated in the Korean 
Constitutional Court Law, that the 
authority of the South Korean 
Constitutional Court is: 
 
23  Lihat 111 Konstitusi Korea Selatan 
(Korean Constitution) dan Pasal 2 
Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi 
Korea Selatan 
24  Jose Andre Soehalim, Pengembangan 
Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi 
Dalam Penerapan Pengaduan 
Konstitusional di Indonesia, Lex 
(1) Judicial review the 
constitutionalism of laws 
(2) Impeachment; 
(3) Dissolution of political 
parties; 
(4) Authority disputes between 
state institutions; and 
(5) Constitutional Complaint.23 
South Korea's Constitutional 
Court is considered to have 
systematically succeeded in 
expanding its jurisdiction to make it 
more accessible to the public, create 
several new unwritten 
constitutional rights, and actively 
promote freedom of expression.24 
South Korea's Constitutional Court 
is also considered to have succeeded 
in limiting political forces and is 
actively involved in ongoing dialogue 
with other political institutions 
regarding the importance of limiting 
government power to realize a 
healthy democracy.25 Therefore, the 
South Korean Constitutional Court 
is considered to have played a major 
role in developing a stronger 
democracy in the country.26 
Specifically regarding the 
authority to examine the 
constitutionalism of laws in South 
Korea which is carried out by the 
Korean Constitutional Court, the 
Administratum, Volume 8 (1), 2020, hal. 
36 
25  I Dewa Gede Palaguna. Pengaduan 
Konstitusional, mengutip dari Tom 
Ginsbug, Judicial Review in New 
Democracies. Constitutional Courts in 
Asian Countries, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), hal. 207 
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power to decide the constitutionality 
of laws enacted by the National 
Assembly is the core jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court.27 
Although generally regarded as a 
model for a centralized or 
concentrated judicial review of laws, 
the Constitutional Court does not 
have the authority to review the 
constitutionality of decisions, 
regulations, or administrative 
actions. This function, according to 
article 107 of the Constitution, is the 
domain of the Supreme Court. It is 
also worth noting the limited nature 
of the provision, as it can only be 
triggered by a lower court's 
discretion, and then formally 
referred to the Constitutional Court 
by the Supreme Court. 
The points of attribution are 
contained in articles 41, 44, 45, and 
47 of the Constitutional Court Law. 
Basically when the constitutionality 
of law relevant to a case is in doubt, 
then the court “will ask the 
Constitutional Court, ex officio or by 
the decision on a party motion, a 
decision on the constitutionality of 
the law, and “will do so through the 
 
27  James West & Dae-Kyu Yoon. West, "The 
constitutional court of the republic of 
Korea: transforming the jurisprudence of 
the vortex?" The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 40.1 (1992): 73-119.	
28  Rodrigo González Quintero "Judicial 
review in the Republic of Korea: an 
introduction." Revista de Derecho 34 
(2010): 1-17. 
29  Amicus Curiae is a legal term, which 
comes from Latin which means "friend of 
the court," or "friend of the court." In 
other words, a person, group of people, 
or an organization, as a third party who 
Supreme Court. "28 Furthermore, 
"the parties to the original case and 
the Minister of Justice may submit 
to the Constitutional Court and the 
amicus brief.”29 on the issue of 
whether a law is constitutional or 
not." The law also allows deciding on 
the constitutionality of an entire law 
or one of its provisions. A decision is 
given by the Constitutional Court to 
hold a statute unconstitutional has 
an erga omnes effect because it "will 
binding on ordinary courts, other 
state agencies, and local 
governments." 
It should be noted that the 
powers granted to this 
Constitutional Court may remain 
passive, marginal, or useless unless 
the court is willing to refer the 
controversy to it. In addition, with 
South Korea's dominant civil law 
tradition, the courts may be 
reluctant to doubt the 
constitutionality of the enacted law. 
Therefore, does this mean that 
Korean citizens are left without 
acquittal if ordinary courts affirm 
the constitutionality of a law, even 
when that party believes otherwise? 
is not a party to a case, but has an 
interest or concern for the case, and then 
provides information, both orally and in 
writing, to assist the court that examines 
and decides the case, because it is 
voluntary and on its initiative, or 
because the court requests it. Even 
though the information given is 
considered important by the giver 
statement, the decision to receive the 
information is left entirely to the court. 
The panel of judges has no obligation to 
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The answer is no, because "if the 
motion made under article 41 
paragraph (1) for the decision on the 
constitutionality of the law is 
rejected, the party can file a 
constitutional objection to the 
Constitutional Court." However, this 
is not an avenue that requires a 
review of lower court decisions 
rejecting referrals, but rather is a 
new case before the Constitutional 
Court stating whether the law is 
constitutional. 
The Constitutional Court has 
adopted, in practice, the German 
custom of passing decisions on the 
constitutionality of laws on different 
categories, apparently to avoid 
tiresome confrontation with other 
branches of government. This 
practice permits a kind of dialogue 
between state organs, which serves 
as a guide for institutions regarding 
the application of statutory laws, 
and persuades some public officials 
to reconsider decisions illuminated 
by constitutional interpretations..30 
Thus, using the effect grading 
technique and in addition to 
restraining the unconstitutionality 
of the law, the Court may pronounce 
a law "incompatible" with the 
Constitution, "limitedly 
 
30  Tom Ginsburg. "Confucian 
constitutionalism? The emergence of 
constitutional review in Korea and 
Taiwan." Law & Social Inquiry 27.4 
(2002): 763-799. 
31  ibid 
32  Stephen Gardbaum, “The New 
Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism”, American Journal of 
unconstitutional", or "limitedly 
adaptable."31	
5. Judicial Review In German 
In Europe, acceptance of the 
Judicial Review idea developed in 3 
(three) stages. First, developments 
in Germany and Italy after World 
War II. Second, it “was after the 
collapse of the Spanish and 
Portuguese authoritarian 
governments, and the Greek 
dictatorship about a quarter-
century ago.”32 Third, “followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union about ten 
years ago.33 according to Schwartz: 
Before World War II, few 
European States had 
constitutional courts, and 
virtually none exercised any 
significant judicial review over 
legislation. After 1945 all that 
changed. West Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Cyprus, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and even 
France…Judicial Revieweated 
tribunals with power to annul 
legislative enactments 
inconsistent with constitutional 
requirements. Many of these 
courts have become significant 
even powerful actors.34 
Comparative Law, Volume 49 (4), 2001, 
hal. 714-715. 
33  Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Fundamental 
Constitutional Rights in the New 
Constitutions of Eastern and Central 
Europe”, Cordozo Journal of 
International & Contemporary Law, 
Volume. 3 (1), 1995, hal. 73. 
34  Herman Schwartz, "The New Eastern 
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On the other hand, the judges 
of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany are divided into two 
Senate in deciding the judicial 
review according to a particular 
case. Eight judges are appointed to 
each Senate. Three of the eight 
judges must be selected from the 
German Supreme Court who has 
served a minimum of 3 years under 
Article 2 of the Federal 
Constitutional Court Act of 
Germany. The duties of the First 
Senate are explained in Article 14 
paragraph (1) of the German 
Constitutional Court Law, “…The 
First Senate of the Federal 
Constitutional Court must have 
competence for judicial review 
(Article 13 no. 6 and 11)”. Cases in 
Articles 13 no.6 and 11 concerning 
conformity of Federal or state law 
with the Constitution or conformity 
of state law with federal law are the 
jurisdiction of the First Senate. On 
the other hand, the duties of the 
Second Senate are explained in 
Article 14 paragraph (2), “The 
Second Senate of the Federal 
Constitutional Court must have 
competence in the case referred to in 
Article 13 no. 1 to 5, 6a to 9, 11a, 
12, and 14, as well as judicial review 
trials and constitutional complaints 
not assigned to the First Senate”. 
They are competent in the case of 
Article 13 no. 1 to 5, 6a to 9, 11a, 
 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Volume. 13 (4), 2002, hal. 763	
35  Mahkamah Konstitusi, Hakim MA 
Belanda Apresiasi Keberadaan MKRI. 
12, and 14 as well as judicial review 
and constitutional complaint trials 
that were not assigned to the First 
Senate. 
6. Judicial Review In Dutch 
One of the interesting things for 
researchers as writers is that until 
this moment, the Netherlands does 
not have a judicial institution that 
specifically handles the issue of 
constitutionality testing of legal 
products, but there is a discourse to 
form a special judicial institution 
that handles constitutional cases 
like Indonesia by establishing 
Constitutional Court. This assertion 
was conveyed by the Dutch 
Supreme Court judge Edgar du 
Perron who was a resource person in 
the recharging program activity held 
by the Constitutional Court (MK) for 
the employees of the Constitutional 
Court in the Constitutional Court's 
Conference Room..35 
Concerning the judicial review 
of fundamental constitutional 
rights, the Netherlands has always 
been somewhat of a stranger in 
Europe. Comparators usually 
describe the way that judicial review 
of legislation in Europe is structured 
somewhat differently from the 
American system, where the 
Supreme Court has essentially 
empowered itself to review the 
constitutionality of statutes. 
Therefore, the power to pass laws in 
Diakses dari: 
https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=
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the New World is exercised by the 
judiciary at large and it is the 
highest court of appeals that 
ultimately decides the matter. 
In contrast, the European 
tradition is closely linked to the 
existence of 'Kelsenian' 
constitutional courts that specialize 
in reviewing the constitutionality of 
statutes and executive acts. Such 
courts exist primarily in Germany, 
Italy, Austria, Spain, and Belgium, 
but also in relatively younger liberal 
democracies such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Constitutional 
courts are almost by definition 
engaged in critical dialogue with 
national legislatures. When Hans 
Kelsen famously described 
constitutional courts as 'negative 
legislators', he was referring to their 
power to overturn legislative acts.36 
It was at this point that the 
Netherlands differed from most of 
their European neighbors. Their 
legal system does not involve 
concentrated review by specialized 
constitutional courts. This is mainly 
because judicial review of primary 
laws is traditionally prohibited 
under Article 120 of the Dutch 
Constitution. It was clear from the 
start that this prohibition on judicial 
review reduced the need for special 
 
36  Jerfi Uzman, Tom Barkhuysen, and 
Michiel L. van Emmerik. "The Dutch 
Supreme Court: A Reluctant Positive 
Legislator?" Netherlands	 Report to the 
Eighteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law. 2010. 
37  Mark Tushnet. Weak courts, strong 
rights: judicial review and social welfare 
courts. However, one would be 
wrong to conclude that there is no 
review of fundamental judicial rights 
in the Netherlands. In contrast, 
Dutch courts usually carry out 
executive action, and sometimes Act 
Parliaments carry out rigorous 
fundamental rights reviews in a way 
that Mark Tushnet would probably 
describe as “strong judicial 
review”.37 This kind of study is 
widespread in the sense that it is 
carried out by any court in the 
country. They do so based on 
another provision in the Dutch 
Constitution, Article 94. It contains 
an obligation to override any kind of 
regulation, whether statutory or not 
if the application of the regulation 
contradicts the provisions of the 
contract law. 
In this sense, it can be argued 
that the Dutch judiciary is in an 
activist way which is sometimes 
rigorous, sometimes cautious, and 
sometimes properly involved in 
reviewing the rights to 
parliamentary statutes. As we will 
note, case law from the highest 
courts shows a tendency to take on 
a positive law-making role in several 
cases.38 
What is interesting, although 
specifically regarding the right to 
rights in comparative constitutional law. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009). Hal. 33 
38  Jerfi Uzman, Tom Barkhuysen, and 
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conduct constitutionality tests, the 
Dutch judiciary does not have the 
right to do so, but under certain 
conditions the Dutch Supreme 
Court can do this, as was the case 
with the Dutch Supreme Court in 
1989, when a group of short-term 
civil servants were promised 
pension benefits which in the end 
the government was not willing to 
provide them. In the short term 
Volunteer In this case, the 
government argues that civil servant 
pensions are carefully regulated by 
parliamentary legislation. Since the 
law has not included the promise, 
denial of benefits is a matter of 
parliamentary legislation and courts 
are not allowed to vote on the 
matter.39 The Court decided 
differently and allowed an appeal, 
the Dutch Supreme Court 
considered that Parliament had not 
intentionally refused to fulfill its 
obligations and therefore the Court 
was in a position to reject the law.40 
7. Judicial Review In Thailand 
Regarding the judicial review in 
Thailand, the constitutional court 
established specifically for such 
cases is the Thai Constitutional 
Court. Before the establishment of 
the Constitutional Court, Thailand 
had tried several models of 
constitutional review. Thailand's 
 
39  ibid 
40  Lihat, misalnya, putusan Mahkamah 
Agung tanggal 9 Juni 1989. Dikutip 
dalam Uzman, Jerfi, Tom Barkhuysen, 
and Michiel L. van	Emmerik. "The Dutch 
Supreme Court: A Reluctant Positive 
Legislator?" Netherlands Report to the 
first constitution of 1932 gave 
Parliament the power to interpret 
the constitution. However, the 
Supreme Court in 1946 declared the 
War Crimes Act unconstitutional 
because the disputed Act, 
retroactively punishing the Thai 
government for joining the Axis in 
World War 2, contradicted the 
Constitution's guarantee of rights 
and freedoms. The decision alarmed 
the legislature, which saw it as an 
arbitrary expansion of judicial 
powers. Parliament then responded 
by establishing a Constitutional 
Panel.41 
The Constitutional Court in 
Thailand is one of the new 
institutions in the constitution as an 
institution of judicial power in 
addition to the Supreme Court, 
Administrative Court, and Military 
Court. The judicial review of the 
Constitution by the Constitutional 
Court in Thailand is somewhat 
different. The subject matter of the 
dispute in the Constitutional Court 
is a petition where a rule of law is 
following or contrary to the 
constitution. To file a lawsuit, it 
must go through two stages, namely 
through the ombudsman and then 
selected to determine which is 
appropriate to be submitted at the 
trial of the Constitutional Court. A 
Eighteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law. 2010. 
41  Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang. "The 
Constitutional Court in Thailand: from 
activism to arbitrariness." Constitutional 
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public petition cannot be submitted 
directly to the Constitutional Court 
but must pass an ombudsman 
selection.42 
The establishment of the 
Constitutional Court in Thailand is 
a response to the transition period 
in Thailand since 1987. The 
transition period was marked by the 
shift of the power of the military 
government to civilian which began 
with the formation of a new 
constitution. Entering 1997, 
Thailand again succeeded in 
formulating a new constitution 
which was the result of a draft 
constitution commission consisting 
of 99 people who were directly 
elected by the people. The 
Constitutional Court is one of the 
new institutions in the constitution 
established by the constitutional 
commission. The position of the 
Constitutional Court as regulated in 
Articles 255-270 is one of the 
institutions of judicial power in 
addition to the Supreme Court, 
Administrative Court, and Military 
Court. The Constitutional Court in 
carrying out its duties remains 
based on the principle of justice in 
general which is based on law and is 
carried out on behalf of the king.43 
 
42  Daniek Okvita K. Kewenangan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Pengujian 
Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-
Undang Terhadap Undang-Undang 
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 
1945. Skripsi (Surakarta: Fakultas 
Hukum Universitas Sebelas Maret, 
2010), hal. 93	
The subject matter of the 
dispute in the Constitutional Court 
is a petition where a rule of law is 
following or contrary to the 
constitution. A public petition 
cannot be directly submitted to the 
Constitutional Court but must go 
through an ombudsman selection. 
And the ombudsman institution is a 
selection agency for petitions that 
can be submitted to the 
Constitutional Court. Cases that 
can be submitted to the 
Constitutional Court are categorized 
as follows: First, the 
constitutionality of laws, draft laws, 
and decrees. Second, the 
qualifications of members of 
parliament, members of the senate, 
ministers, and high-ranking state 
officials. Third, the qualifications 
and legality of political parties and 
their members. Fourth, the 
unconstitutionality of the rules of 
procedure for the parliament, the 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission, and the General 
Elections Commission. Fifth, other 
cases submitted to the 
Constitutional Court under the 
authority of other laws such as 
political party and election laws.44 
The Constitutional Court 
consists of 15 (fifteen) judges with a 
43  Surkati, Achmad. "Kedudukan dan 
Wewenang Mahkamah Konstitusi 
Ditinjau Dari Demokrasi Konstitusional 
Studi Perbandingan di Tiga Negara: 
Indonesia, Jerman, Thailand." Jurnal 
Equality 11 (2006). Hal. 44 
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term of service of 9 years with a 
retirement period of 70 years, a 
presiding judge, and 14 (fourteen) 
member judges who are appointed 
with the approval of the king. Five 
Supreme Court justices who are 
internally elected by the Supreme 
Court in closed elections, two 
Supreme Court justices from the 
Administrative Court, five people 
with legal expertise, and three 
people with political science 
expertise.45 More details are 
described in the following table: 






Supreme Court 5 







 As it is known that one of the 
most important authorities 
possessed by Thailand is to conduct 
Reviewing Law and Lawmaking. 
This is the main function of the 
judicial power of the Constitutional 
Court. If a provision of a law is found 
to be unconstitutional, the law will 
be annulled. The term “statutory 
provisions” refers to statutes 
approved by the people's 
representatives, therefore, 
constitute organic statutes and 
ordinary parliamentary statutes. 
 
45  Ibid	
However, constitutional review of an 
organic law is mandatory, whereas 
ordinary law review is only optional. 
Before the presentation of an 
organic law to the King for 
signature, it must be submitted to 
the Constitutional Court. For 
ordinary deeds, there are several 
ways to convey it. As a bill, the 
second member of the DPR can ask 
the Constitutional Court to review 
its constitutionality. Once the bill 
becomes law, it can be submitted to 
the Constitutional Court through 
four channels. First, a person who 
feels that his rights have been 
violated by an act can file a lawsuit 
to the Constitutional Court. This is 
a new idea from the 2007 
Constitution. However, to avoid 
many lawsuits, the applicant must 
first take other legal remedies before 
being eligible to file a petition. 
Second, the complaint is submitted 
to the Ombudsman, after receiving 
the complaint, the Ombudsman can 
send the law to the Constitutional 
Court for review. Third, through 
Komnas HAM.46 







Page 103 h t t p : / / e j u r n a l . u n g . a c . i d / i n d e x . p h p / J L              V o l .  1 4  N o .  2  
 
5. Conclusion 
 In general, there are 3 (three) 
constitutionality testing 
mechanisms that have been 
developed to date, namely: First, the 
constitutionality testing of laws is 
carried out by existing judicial 
institutions or non-special 
adjudication, namely the Supreme 
Court. The country that adopts this 
system is the United States of 
America. Second, the 
constitutionality test of the law is 
carried out by a special judicial 
institution, namely the 
Constitutional Court. Countries 
that have adopted this system are 
Indonesia, Germany, South Korea, 
South Africa, Russia, Thailand, and 
Turkey. The constitutionality of the 
law is examined by non-judicial 
institutions. The country that 
adopted this system in France. The 
author also recommends using a 
judicial review approach such as 
that used in the US and South Africa 
that is open to providing listening 
input outside the judiciary.	
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